We consider the risk premium demanded by a decision maker in order to be indifferent between obtaining a new level of wealth with certainty, or to participate in a lottery which either results in unchanged wealth or an even higher level than what can be obtained with certainty. We study preferences such that the corresponding relative risk premium is a decreasing function of present wealth, and we determine the set of associated utility functions. We find a new characterization of risk vulnerability and determine a large set of utility functions, closed under summation and composition, which are both risk vulnerable and have decreasing relative risk premium. We finally introduce the notion of partial risk neutral preferences on binary lotteries and show that partial risk neutrality is equivalent to preferences with decreasing relative risk premium.
Introduction
In the theory of Morgenstern and von Neumann (with later contributions) preferences over lotteries are resolved by calculating expected utility from a utility function u which is unique up to the composition with increasing affine transformations. The assumptions of greed and risk aversion are then characterized by the requirements that u is non-decreasing and concave. It is well-known [10] that some utility functions within this class imply an implausible fast depreciation of marginal utility as a function of wealth. This applies for example to functions with constant absolute risk aversion.
Consider a decision maker with wealth x who is given the choice between obtaining an alternative level of wealth y 1 with certainty, or to participate in a lottery which will result in either unchanged wealth x or a level of wealth y 2 strictly bigger than y 1 .
The problem arises in situations where the decision maker is confronted with a choice between two mutually exclusive possibilities. Either engage in an activity which results in wealth y 1 with certainty, or try an alternative activity which, if successful, gives a higher level of wealth y 2 > y 1 but may fail to materialize and then leaves the decision maker with the present level of wealth x unchanged. Let a = a(x, y 1 , y 2 ) be the expected level of wealth in the lottery between x and y 2 which gives the same expected utility as obtaining y 1 with certainty. The agent is thus indifferent between obtaining the level of wealth y 1 for sure or participate in a lottery between x and y 2 giving the expected wealth a. We define for y 1 < y 2 the relative risk premium λ(x) = a − y 1 y 1 − x x = y 1 as the quotient between the risk premium π = a − y 1 divided by the opportunity cost y 1 − x which the agent puts on the line by choosing the lottery in place of y 1 with certainty. We note that a and therefore λonly depend on x, y 1 , y 2 and the values of the utility function in these three points. It is by construction a reflection of the agent's preferences and is therefore left invariant under affine transformations of the utility function. This may also be verified directly. The discussion above is made under the implicit assumptions that the utility function is concave and x < y 1 such that the risk premium is positive and the equivalent level of expected wealth a is placed between y 1 and y 2 . But this is done only to facilitate the reader's perception, and no such restrictions are to be imposed. If for example the utility function is convex, then the risk premium is negative. Definition 1.1. Let u be an increasing utility function defined in an open interval I = (α, β). We say that u has decreasing relative risk premium, if the relative risk premium λ(x), for arbitrary y 1 < y 2 in I, is a decreasing function in x ∈ I\{y 1 , y 2 }.
We develop an easy-to-use criterion for determining whether a utility function has decreasing relative risk premium, cf. Theorem 2.4 (iii), and it follows that often used utility functions like
where α∈ [0, 1] and λ≥0 and their compositions like for example u(x) = x x +λ α and u(x) = log x x +λ all have decreasing relative risk premium. The property is thus satisfied in many situations already considered by economists. But there are also functions, used in for example financial theory, which are not in the class.
This applies most notably to functions like u(x) = 1−exp(−x) with constant absolute risk aversion.
The notion of relative risk premium focuses more on the terminal level of wealth than on the pay-off in the lottery. It has a local version, as will be demonstrated later, which makes it possible to compare it with ArrowPratt's measure [8] of absolute risk aversion. The two notions are different, but decreasing relative risk premium implies decreasing absolute risk aversion. The function u(x) = 1 − exp(− √x ) does not have decreasing relative risk premium, but it is increasing, concave and the absolute risk aversion is tending to zero as x approaches infinity.
In Section 3 we turn the attention to risk vulnerability and investigate its possible relationship with decreasing relative risk premium. We are in particular interested in determining a large common domain of utility functions that possesses both properties and is closed under addition and composition.
In Section 4 we consider lotteries of the form (x, p) with outcomes (x 1 , x 2 ), where p is the probability of obtaining x 1 . To every set of intertwined outcomes x 1 < y 1 < x 2 < y 2 we introduce in equation (11) a mapping p → q + (p), depending only on the outcomes, of the unit interval into itself. The expected values of the lotteries satisfy E(x, p)≤E(y, q) for every p ∈ [0, 1] and every q ∈ [0, q + (p)]. We say that a decision maker is partially risk neutral if he prefers (y, q) to (x, p) for every p ∈ [0, 1] and every q ∈ [0, q + (p)], that is if the decision maker chooses as if he were risk neutral in these choice situations.
We finally obtain that a decision maker is partially risk neutral if and only if his preferences represent decreasing relative risk premium. This opens up the possibility of analyzing markets with highly inhomogeneous investors.
Decreasing relative risk premium
It is not at all obvious that a sum of two utility functions, each with decreasing relative risk premium, has decreasing relative risk premium. But we do note that the point-wise limit of utility functions with decreasing relative risk premium retains the property.
Geometric description
The expected level of wealth a is calculated by setting
therefore the risk premium
where the divided difference [t, s] u is defined by setting
The relative risk premium λis therefore given by
and it is the relative increase in slope of the line connecting (x, u(x)) and (y 1 , u(y 1 )) in comparison with the line connecting (x, u(x)) and (y 2 , u(y 2 )).
Various characterizations
We begin by characterizing utility functions with decreasing relative risk premium in terms of their monotonicity properties when lifted to functions of two by two matrices. The characterization implies that a sum of utility functions, each with decreasing relative risk premium, retains the property. The notion of decreasing relative risk premium may therefore be used also in the study of aggregated demand. Let A = (a ij ) be a Hermitian two by two matrix with eigenvalues λand µ in the interval I. It can be written on the form
where Q is an orthogonal matrix. The functional calculus is defined by setting
We say that u is 2-monotone in the interval I if
for all Hermitian two by two matrices A and B with eigenvalues in I. Note that the order relation is defined by setting A≤B if B − A is positive semidefinite. More generally, we say that a function is n-monotone if the same conditions apply for n × n matrices.
Theorem 2.1. The relative risk premium λof an increasing function u is decreasing if and only if u is 2-monotone.
Proof. The relative risk premium is decreasing if and only if
or equivalently, that the determinant of the (non-symmetric) matrix
for x 1 < x 2 and y 1 < y 2 . But Löwner's theorem [6] characterizes the 2-monotone functions by exactly this condition. QED Inspection of the reference reveals that condition (1) is only required for points in I with x 1 < y 1 < x 2 < y 2 and then it is automatically satisfied for all points with (x 2 − x 1 )(y 2 − y 1 ) > 0. Löwner's characterization of matrix monotonicity is highly sophisticated even in the case of only two by two matrices, and it is outside the scope of the present paper to give the proof. Although the area has received much attention there are no good references other than the (difficult to read) original article. This is because later authors have concentrated on alternative ways of characterizing matrix monotonicity resulting in a situation where condition (1), even among specialists, is not well known. (i) The set of utility functions defined in I with decreasing relative risk premium is a convex cone.
(ii) If u 1 and u 2 are utility functions with decreasing relative risk premium defined in open intervals I 1 and I 2 and u 1 (I 1 )⊆I 2 , then the composed function u(x) = u 2 (u 1 (x)) has decreasing relative risk premium.
Proof. The two assertions are trivial consequences of 2-monotonicity. Indeed, if A≤B are Hermitian two by two matrices with eigenvalues in I and u 1 and u 2 are 2-monotone, then
which shows that u 1 + u 2 is 2-monotone and hence has decreasing relative risk premium. Similarly, u 1 (A)≤u 1 (B) and hence (ii) If the derivative u (x) = 0 in some point x ∈ I, then u is constant.
Proof. The first item is a non-trivial part of Löwner's theorem [6] . Since u is continuously differentiable we may in condition (1) let y 1 tend to x 1 and let y 2 tend to x 2 to obtain
The necessary condition in equation (2) may be reformulated as positive definiteness of the matrix
For a continuously differentiable function u this condition also implies 2-monotonicity [6] and therefore decreasing relative risk premium. A utility function with decreasing relative risk premium is automatically continuously differentiable, but it may not be twice differentiable. However, we may in most applications assume that it is even infinitely many times differentiable. Indeed, let ϕ be a positive and even C ∞ -function defined in the real axis, vanishing outside the closed interval [−1, 1] and normalized such that
For any locally integrable function u defined in an open interval (a, b) we form its regularization
for small >0, and realize that it is infinitely many times differentiable. For t ∈ (a + , b − ) we may also write
If u is continuous, then u converges uniformly to u on any compact subinterval of (a, b). If u is a utility function with decreasing relative risk premium, then it is 2-monotone in (a, b) and u is 2-monotone in the slightly smaller interval (a + , b − ). In conclusion, u is the uniform limit in any compact subinterval of (a, b) of the utility functions u which are infinitely many times differentiable and have decreasing relative risk premium.
We can now give a concrete description of the set of utility functions with decreasing relative risk premium (the proof may be found in the appendix). (i) u has decreasing relative risk premium.
is positive semi-definite for each x ∈ I.
(iii) The derivative u can be written on the form
where c is a positive concave function.
It is an easy consequence of Theorem 2.4 (iii) that the utility functions mentioned in the introduction have decreasing relative risk premium. Indeed, if we for each of these functions calculate the corresponding function c(
then we realize that c(x) in each case is positive and concave. But we also realize that utility functions which are not concave may have decreasing relative risk premium. Consider for example the function
where c(x) = 1 − x is positive and concave in (0, 1). The increasing function u(x) is therefore both convex and has decreasing relative risk premium.
Finally, the utility function u(x) = 1 − e −x is increasing, concave and has constant absolute risk aversion, but it does not have decreasing relative risk premium. Indeed, u (x) = c(x) −2 and the function c(x) = e x/2 is not concave.
In the small and in the large
The notion of decreasing relative risk premium depends on the comparison of utility values for different and possibly wildly separated levels of wealth, and it is therefore of a global nature by construction. A priory it is far from obvious whether it would be possible to piece together utility functions, which each has decreasing relative risk premium in small but overlapping intervals, and in this way obtain a function with decreasing relative risk premium in the union of the intervals.
Corollary 2.5. Decreasing relative risk premium in the small implies decreasing relative risk premium in the large.
Proof. Consider a function u defined in the union of two overlapping open intervals I 1 and I 2 such that the restrictions u| I 1 and u| I 2 have decreasing relative risk premium. We want to prove that u necessarily has decreasing relative risk premium also in the union I 1 ∪ I 2 . Possibly by first taking its regularization we may assume that u is three (or infinitely many) times continuously differentiable. If u (x) = 0 for any x in the union I 1 ∪ I 2 then u is a constant function. We may therefore also assume that u is strictly increasing. The statement is then a consequence of item (ii) in Theorem 2.4.
Consider now a utility function u defined in an open interval I such that u has decreasing relative risk premium in a (possibly very small) neighborhood of each point x ∈ I. Consider a fixed x in I and let J be the union of all open intervals in I containing x and such that u has decreasing relative risk premium in each of the intervals. It follows by the preceding argument that u has decreasing relative risk premium in J. If J is a proper subset of I there is a y ∈ J which is a boundary point of J and a small open interval containing y in which u has decreasing relative risk premium. Repeating the argument we may thus conclude that u has decreasing relative risk premium in a larger interval than J contradicting the construction of J. Therefore J = I and u has decreasing relative risk premium in I. QED Corollary 2.6. Let u be a function with decreasing relative risk premium in an interval (x 0 , ∞) for some x 0 ∈ R. Then u is concave. If in addition u is three times continuously differentiable, then the representing function c in Theorem 2.4 (iii) is increasing.
Proof. We may by possibly considering its regularization assume that u is three times continuously differentiable. The derivative then has the form
for some positive concave function c. But a positive concave function defined in (x 0 , ∞) cannot decrease in any point, since otherwise it would, because of concavity, become negative for large values of x ∈ (x 0 , ∞). Therefore c (x)≥0 and
It is remarkable that decreasing relative risk premium, which is a measure of risk taking, implies risk aversion on infinite intervals (x 0 , ∞). The reason is clear from the above proof. If u(x) were not concave everywhere, then c (x) would be negative for some x and c(x), which is concave, would then go to zero in a bounded interval. The utility function would consequently tend asymptotically to infinity as x approached some finite value. In other words, if the decreasing relative risk premium were not tempered by risk aversion, then the utility would increase towards infinity for finite levels of wealth.
Corollary 2.7. Let u be a three times continuously differentiable function with decreasing relative risk premium defined in the interval (x 0 , ∞) for some x 0 ∈ R. The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion −u (x)/u (x) is then a decreasing function in x and tends to zero as x approaches infinity.
Proof. The derivative of the absolute risk aversion
is negative if and only if u (x)u (x)≥u (x) 2 . But since u satisfies the even stronger condition
cf. Theorem 2.4 (ii), we derive that the absolute risk aversion is decreasing in x. The absolute risk aversion may be written on the form
where we used Theorem 2.4 (iii), and we note that it is non-negative by Corollary 2.6. The derivative c (x) is decreasing since c(x) is concave. The absolute risk aversion therefore tends to zero if c(x) goes to infinity. If on the other hand c(x) is bounded, then the derivative c (x) goes to zero as x approaches infinity, and we obtain the same conclusion. QED
Risk vulnerability
Gollier and Pratt [3] introduced the notion of risk vulnerability which captures the situation where the addition of an unfair background risk to wealth makes risk averse individuals behave in a more risk-averse way with respect to any other independent risk. This natural notion is not a consequence of risk aversion alone. Suppose a decision maker with utility function u: ]x 0 , ∞[→ R is subject to an unfair riskz to wealth. To keep matters simple we may approximate the risk with a lotteryz = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) with probabilities p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and expected value E(z, p) = p 1 z 1 + · · · + p n z n ≤0. The indirect utility function v is then defined by setting
where z min = min{z 1 , . . . , z n }. The decision maker is risk vulnerable if the absolute risk aversion increases in the presence of an unfair risk to wealth, that is if
It follows immediately from Corollary 2.2 that the indirect utility function to a utility function with decreasing relative risk premium also has decreasing relative risk premium. The auxiliary function may be written on the form
where the hat denotes rotation of the vector by π/2 in the positive direction. The auxiliary function is thus a quadratic form in u. We shall characterize risk vulnerability in terms of the auxiliary function rather than using the bivariate function of Pratt and Gollier. The reason is that the bivariate function for a sum becomes very complicated, since there is no simple connection between the absolute risk aversion of a sum and the absolute risk aversion of the constituent parts.
We consider the following condition
for the auxiliary function ϕ, wherez is an arbitrary lottery with probability vector p and mean zero. The condition is considerably weaker than convexity but equivalent to the inequality
which may also be written as
This condition expresses that the absolute risk aversion of the indirect utility function for an independent mean zero background risk is greater than or equal to the absolute risk aversion of u. Since an unfair lottery may be composed of a deterministic drop in wealth and a mean zero lottery we obtain: A risk vulnerable function has decreasing absolute risk aversion, so we are not making any restrictions by imposing the assumption.
Since the auxiliary function ϕ(t) has the opposite sign of t, when u has decreasing absolute risk aversion, we obtain ϕ (0) ≤0 if ϕ is differentiable. If in addition u is strictly concave we obtain
is the absolute prudence, and we realize that p(x)≥r(x) at any level of wealth. Condition (6) implies that any cord between (−y 2 , ϕ(−y 2 )) and (y 1 , ϕ(y 1 )) has non-negative value in zero for y 1 , y 2 > 0. If u is four times differentiable this implies (ii) The auxiliary function ϕ satisfies
for all y 1 , y 2 > 0 such that x + y 1 ∈ I and x − y 2 ∈ I.
(iii) The absolute risk aversion
x ∈ I for all y 1 , y 2 > 0 such that x + y 1 ∈ I and x − y 2 ∈ I (the right-hand side converges towards r(x) as y 1 and y 2 tend to zero).
(iv) The absolute risk aversion r(x) satisfies the inequality
for arbitrary x ∈ I and positive real numbers y 1 , y 2 with x + y 1 ∈ I and x − y 2 ∈ I, where λ= y 2 u (x + y 1 ) y 1 u (x − y 2 ) + y 2 u (x + y 1 ) .
(Notice that 0 <λ<1).
Proof. The identity
shows that condition (6) implies (ii). Assuming (ii) the identity also shows that any chord across zero has a non-negative value in zero. Possibly by appealing to Charathéodory's theorem this implies condition (6) and thus risk vulnerability. We also realize that risk vulnerability is equivalent to
where the second divided difference
By calculation we obtain the identity
showing that (iii) is equivalent to risk vulnerability. The auxiliary function may be written as
so condition (ii) takes the form
which shows that (ii) and (iv) are equivalent. QED
The following result due to Gollier and Pratt is now an easy consequence of the preceding theorem. If λis defined as in (iv) of Theorem 3.3, the quantity
is positive since u is concave. Therefore
which implies that u is risk vulnerable. QED
Explicit examples
It can be quite easy to work with condition (ii) of Theorem 3.3 as we shall demonstrate in the following example. We extend (only in the following example) the notion of risk vulnerability to functions that are neither concave or have decreasing absolute risk aversion by considering only mean zero background risks.
Example 3.5. The function u(x) = x α defined in the positive half-line is risk vulnerable for 0≤α≤1 and α≥2. It is not risk vulnerable for 1 <α<2.
Proof. The auxiliary function is calculated to be
and the statement follows since
is increasing for 0≤α≤1 and α≥2, and decreasing for 1 <α<2. QED If we set u(x) = x 1/2 and calculate the auxiliary function ϕ(t) with base point x = 1, we obtain the following visualization of the auxiliary function and its second derivative. A function may be risk vulnerable without having decreasing relative risk premium. The opposite may also take place.
Example 3.6. The function
has decreasing relative risk premium. Indeed, the derivative may be written on the form u (x) = c(x) −2 , where
is positive and concave 1 . We will demonstrate that u is not risk vulnerable. The derivatives are given by
One may argue that u is not three times continuously differentiable as required in Theorem 2.4. However, inspection of the proof shows that the sufficiency condition only requires u to be continuously differentiable.
Setting x = 1 − ε for a small positive ε the auxiliary function takes the form
for y 1 > ε and 0 < y 2 < x.
This quantity is, for a fixed 0 < y 2 < x, negative for small positive ε and y 1 . Therefore u is not risk vulnerable.
Lemma 3.7. Let λ≥0. The function
Proof. The function has decreasing absolute risk aversion and
is increasing, where ϕ(t) is the auxiliary function. QED
The sum of two risk vulnerable utility functions is not necessarily risk vulnerable, but we have the following result with the proof given in the appendix.
Theorem 3.8. Let λ 1 , . . . ,λ n and a 1 , . . . , a n be positive real numbers. The function
is risk vulnerable.
Corollary 3.9. Any function of the form
where α≥0 and µ is a positive Borel measure with support in [0, ∞) such that the integral (λ 2 + 1) −1 dµ(λ) is finite, is risk vulnerable and has decreasing relative risk premium.
Proof. The functions on the form (8) constitute the set of functions defined in the positive half-line that are n-monotone for arbitrary n, cf. [2, Chap. II Theorem 1 and Lemma 2]. They are in particular 2-monotone and have thus decreasing relative risk premium. In addition, the functions have decreasing absolute risk aversion according to Corollary 2.7. A function u of the given form (8) may be obtained as the point-wise limit of a sequence of functions
each of which is risk vulnerable by Theorem 3.8. We may consider each of these functions as written on the form (8) with respect to a discrete measure µ n . Since u n (1) converges to u(1), it readily follows that the sequence of measures dν n = (λ 2 + 1) −1 dµ n (λ) is bounded, and since the unit ball of measures is weekly compact, there is a weakly convergent subnet ν α . The limit measure of the subnet is by the representation theorem of Pick functions necessarily equal to (1 +λ 2 ) −1 dµ(λ). Therefore also the first and second derivatives of u α converge to u. We finally realize that the auxiliary function of u satisfies condition (ii) of Theorem 3.3. QED
The functions given on the form (8) are also called operator monotone. We have identified a large set of functions which are both risk vulnerable and have decreasing relative risk premium. The set is closed under the formation of sums and compositions (when possible), and it contains all the examples of functions with decreasing relative risk premium discussed in the introduction. The two notions, decreasing relative risk premium and risk vulnerability, are both representing preferences that are attractive and may be considered expressions of reasonable behavior, although they are pulling in different directions. The first notion is a measure of risk willingness which excludes implausible fast depreciation of marginal utility as a function of wealth. The other notion captures the prudence of becoming more risk averse when confronted with an independent unfair risk to wealth. It is significant that the important and very well-behaved set of operator monotone functions unites both properties.
If f is a positive function in the class (8) it can be written on the form
where µ is a positive (non-vanishing) finite measure on the extended halfline [0, ∞]. This subclass of risk vulnerable functions with decreasing relative risk premium is closed under both sums and compositions of functions. We recover the power utility functions by the identity
valid for 0 <α<1, and the logarithm by
Preferences on lotteriesS
uppose that a decision maker with utility function u has to decide between lotteries (x, p) and (y, q) with outcomes (x 1 , x 2 ) and (y 1 , y 2 ) respectively. Thenỹ is preferred if the expected utilities satisfy
where p is the probability of outcome x 1 inx and q is the probability of outcome y 1 inỹ. The only case difficult to analyze is when the outcomes are intertwined like x 1 < y 1 < x 2 < y 2 . We then introduce the numbers
and note that they only depend on the outcomes. ˜L emma 4.1. Let x 1 < y 1 < x 2 < y 2 be real numbers. The mapping
where a and b are defined in (10) , maps the unit interval [0, 1] into itself. It is minimal in the sense that there exists a probability p ∈ [0, 1] such that the expected values E(x, p) and E(y, q + (p)) of the two lotteries are identical. Furthermore, the expected values satisfy
Proof. A simple calculation shows that a 2 + b 2 = 1, therefore the matrix
is consequently a unit vector, and since
we obtain 0≤q + (p)≤1. We obtain by tedious calculations
2 There is an ambiguity in this choice. We might as well be working with the inverse Q 
and the weaker condition q ∈ [0, q − (p)]. We have chosen the more restrictive version, and this plays a role in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Since the right hand side of (12) is positive semi-definite, we have for arbitrary
The proof of the next theorem may be found in the appendix.
Theorem 4.2. Let u be a utility function defined in an open interval I, and let x 1 < y 1 < x 2 < y 2 be intertwined outcomes in two lotteriesx andỹ. If u has decreasing relative risk premium, then the expected utilities
for every p ∈ [0, 1], where q + (p) is the function defined in Lemma 4.1. If on the other hand a decision maker share these preferences on lotteries, then he necessarily has decreasing relative risk premium.Ã decision maker with decreasing relative risk premium makes the same decisions as a risk neutral decision maker would do when confronted with the choices in the preceding theorem, cf. Lemma 4.1. This is not surprising since a risk neutral decision maker has decreasing relative risk premium. Definition 4.3. We say that a decision maker is partially risk neutral, if he prefers (y, q) to (x, p) for every p ∈ [0, 1] and q ∈ [0, q + (p)] for all binary lotteries (x, p) and (y, q) with intertwined outcomes x 1 < y 1 < x 2 < y 2 , where q + (p) is defined in Lemma 4.1. 
Examples
Heterogeneous decision makers with possibly very different utility functions, but of the form mentioned in the introduction, nevertheless share preferences on the risky lotteries exhibited in this section. In the following example we set x 1 = 1, y 1 = 2, x 2 = 3 and y 2 = 4. We obtain a = √ 3/2, b = 1/2 and calculate the probability map
We consider two decision makers with utility functions u 1 (x) = x 1/2 and u 2 (x) = x 4/10 . The expected utility of (x, p) as a function of p is for the two decision makers indicated by the two straight lines in the diagram. Since u 1 ≥ u 2 in the four outcomes, we realize that the upper straight line represents the expected utility E u 1 (x, p). We note that, although the decision makers are heterogeneous, they have for all p ∈ [0, 1] the same preferences on the lotteries (x, p) and (y, q + (p)). In fact, they share these preferences with all decision makers, some risk averse and some risk lovers, with decreasing relative risk premium in an open interval containing the four outcomes. We learned in Theorem 4.2 that a decision maker may share the preferences on the type of risky lotteries considered in this section with one (and then with all) decision makers with decreasing relative risk premium, if and only if he himself has decreasing relative risk premium.
Let us now consider a decision maker with a utility function
with constant absolut risk aversion. It does not have decreasing relative risk premium, and this is reflected in the next diagram. or small values of p the third decision maker prefers (x, p) to (y, q + (p)), thus disagreeing with the first two decision makers.
We have shown that preferences with decreasing relative risk premium may be equivalently expressed by preferences on risky lotteries. It seems very difficult to obtain this equivalence without first characterizing the corresponding class of utility functions.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.4: We rely heavily on the work of Dobsch [1] and Donoghue [2] . Firstly, we remind that higher ordens divided differences (in mutually distinct points) are defined recursively by setting
They are symmetric functions in the arguments x 1 , x 2 etc. and if u is three times continuously differentiable, then the second and third order divided differences above may be extended to continuous functions. The mean value theorem for divided difference implies that
If u has decreasing relative risk premium, then the determinant
where we write [x, x] u = u (x). Let x 1 = x 2 and subtract the first column from the second. By using the recursive property of divided differences we obtain
Next we subtract the first row from the second row in the new matrix and obtain
By letting x 1 and x 2 tend to x we obtain
Since u (x) > 0 we realize that u (x) cannot be negative. All three principal determinants in the matrix are thus non-negative, and this implies (ii).
(ii) ⇒ (iii) : Put c(x) = u (x) −1/2 for x ∈ I. Then c is a positive function and u (x) = c(x) −2 . By differentiation we obtain u (x) = −2c(x) −3 c (x) and
The determinant
is non-negative by (ii), thus inserting the derivatives we obtain
hence c (x)≤0 for every x ∈ I and c is concave.
First order divided differences may trivially be expressed by
This is a small part of the Hermite formulae [4] . By using (iii) and the concavity of c we obtain
where we set g(x) = x −1 and used the Hermite formula once more. But since
we obtain u (
u . But this is the local condition (3) for 2-monotonicity. Therefore u has decreasing relative risk premium. QED Proof of Theorem 3.8: The function u(x) is n-monotone for arbitrary n and has in particular decreasing relative risk premium. The absolute risk aversion is therefore decreasing according to Corollary 2.7. The auxiliary function
where ϕ i,i (t) = 2 (x +λ i ) 2 (x + t +λ i ) 3 − 2 (x +λ i ) 3 (x + t +λ i ) 2 is recognized to satisfy condition (ii) of Theorem 3.3 by Lemma 3.7. Since the condition is additive in ϕ we only have to verify it for each single term. For fixed i = j we write ϕ i,j (t) + ϕ j,i (t) = 2 (x +λ i ) 2 (x + t +λ j ) 3 − 2 (x +λ i ) 3 (x + t +λ j ) 2 + 2 (x +λ j ) 2 (x + t +λ i ) 3 − 2 (x +λ j ) 3 (x + t +λ i ) 2 = 2(−t +λ i −λ j ) (x +λ i ) 3 (x + t +λ j ) 3 + 2(−t − (λ i −λ j )) (x +λ j ) 3 (x + t +λ i ) 3 = f(t) + g(t), where f(t) = −2t (x +λ i ) 3 (x + t +λ j ) 3 + −2t (x +λ j ) 3 (x + t +λ i ) 3 , g(t) = 2(λ i −λ j ) 1 (x +λ i ) 3 (x + t +λ j ) 3 + −1 (x +λ j ) 3 (x + t +λ i ) 3 . = E u (y, q + (p)) ≤E u (y, q), 0≤q≤q + (p),
where we used that Q transforms the probability distribution (p, 1 − p) into the distribution (q + (p), 1 − q + (p)).S uppose on the other hand that a decision maker with increasing utility function u defined in an open interval I prefers the lotteries (y, q + (p)) to (x, p) for arbitrary outcomes x 1 < y 1 < x 2 < y 2 in I and every p ∈ [0, 1]. Let now A and B be Hermitian two by two matrices with eigenvalues in I and suppose B = A + cP, where c > 0 and P is the orthogonal projection on a single unit vector. Donoghue proved [2, Chapter VI] that if x 1 , x 2 are the eigenvalues of A and y 1 , y 2 are the eigenvalues of B, both written in increasing order, then they are intertwined x 1 < y 1 < x 2 < y 2 and the equation B − A = cP may be written as in equation (12) . This expression is unique with the exception that Q may be interchanged with Q −1 resulting in a change of sign of the off-diagonal entries. A matrix inequality cannot be established by merely considering expectation values in vectors with non-negative entries. But the interchange of Q with Q −1 may conveniently be transformed into a change of sign of one of the components of the vector to which the matrices are applied. By imposing the more restrictive condition q + (p) we therefore obtain that the decision maker's preferences on lotteries imply u(A)≤u(B).
Let finally A and B be arbitrary Hermitian two by two matrices with eigenvalues in I and suppose that A≤B. By the spectral theorem we may write A≤C≤B, where the differences C − A and B − C both are positive multiples of one-dimensional projections. Repeated application of the previous result thus entails u(A)≤u(B). But this means that u is 2-monotone and the decision maker therefore has decreasing relative risk premium.
QED
